It is understood that it is important to determine the place of consciousness in our life, and that at the turn of the twentieth century this was a problem common to both Bergson and 'phenomenology,' that of Husserl at least. For both these philosophers, to return to the 'things themselves' is neither to escape from our consciousness nor from our lives, but to criticize a false conception of each (and through them of all things), and to return to them in their immediate and intimate connection, the principle of access not only to a rigorous philosophy in general (of all things), but also to a double unity, to the meaning of life for consciousness and to the role of consciousness in our lives.
'consciousness or life?' -seemingly simplistic and brutal, set like a knife to the neck in the corner of a wood by a philosophical coup de force! Our aim is to show, from one side of this apparent alternative, the 'Bergsonian' direction, that the situation is quite otherwise; in the sense that if the relation between 'Bergson and phenomenology' rests on an opposition, it is not on a shallow opposition between consciousness and life, but rests rather on two opposite ways of understanding the connection between consciousness and life, which are indeed primarily together, or not at all.
More precisely, one must show that the fundamental aim of Bergson is not to reduce 'consciousness as such' to 'life as such,' but instead to distinguish between two senses of consciousness and also between two senses of life -this distinction by itself accounting for its opposition to, and for its profound relation with, phenomenology. Indeed, not only is 'life,' with which Bergson must renew consciousness, still defined by a form or act of consciousness (even if it opposes itself to that which phenomenology describes as fundamental), but in addition, starting from this sense of life and consciousness we must be able to rejoin or even engender this other form of consciousness, which is described precisely by phenomenology as fundamental! Once again, not only does this double task of distinction and unification of two senses of consciousness and life belong properly to philosophy, but this distinction and this unity must manifest itself first of all in our experience itself. What are the points of rupture, not between consciousness and life, but between two senses of the one and of the other, in our consciousness and our lives themselves? How does this division or tear arise and express itself, and what unity does it reveal in return? Far from being abstract and academic, such are the questions to which a confrontation between 'Bergson and phenomenology' could lead.
But first we should return to the distinction between two senses of consciousness and life in the thought of Bergson: why did it give rise to such a profound misunderstanding, particularly with phenomenology? On what does it rest and, if it is really on the fundamental distinction between duration and space, are there really two sides -consciousness and life? How in the end to surmount it, to think at once consciousness 'of' life (is it intuition?) and consciousness 'in' life (is it an action, or a creation?)? It is to these questions, then, that we will try to respond.
Consciousness or life? Beyond a misunderstanding
The principal thesis on consciousness that makes the difference between 'Bergson and phenomenology,' as well as the misunderstanding or misinterpretation that most often concerns it (and that prevents one from seeing there not only an opposition but an essential relation), can be concisely presented.
